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This paper analyzes the role of private information in parimutuel (also known as pool betting) 
markets, a method commonly adopted to determine betting odds for horse races and other sport-
ing events. According to the parimutuel system, the amount wagered on all outcomes is redistrib-
uted to the bets placed on the winning outcome. Given the frequent observation of the realized 
outcomes (which are not affected by the market process) and the absence of book makers (who 
could induce biases), parimutuel betting markets offer an ideal testbed for theories of informa-
tion aggregation and market efficiency.
The efficient market hypothesis asserts that the fraction of money wagered by the market on an 
outcome is an unbiased estimate of the outcome’s empirical frequency. Beginning with Richard 
M. Griffith (1949), empirical studies have established that market probabilities of favorites (i.e., 
outcomes with short odds) tend to underpredict their empirical probabilities; conversely, long-
shots are overbet and yield lower expected returns at the final odds.1 The favorite-longshot bias 
(FLB) is perceived as a systematic deviation from the efficient market hypothesis.
In this paper, we argue that one should expect the FLB to result when a large number of pri-
vately informed bettors take simultaneous positions just before post time.2 Our resolution of the 
FLB is based on the identification of the empirical probability of an outcome with the outcome’s 
posterior probability derived by Bayes’s rule to incorporate the information revealed by the bets 
placed in equilibrium. Using the equilibrium structure to compute the Bayesian posterior prob-
ability associated with any realized market probability, we show that the ex post realization of a 
high market probability indicates favorable information about the outcome’s likelihood—and the 
opposite for longshots. The FLB is present because in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium bettors are not 
allowed to revise their positions to incorporate the surprise revealed by the final odds. The bias 
would instead be eliminated in a rational expectations equilibrium.
I. Model
To illustrate our argument, we focus on the simplest setting with a binary outcome, k ∈ {1, 2}. 
There are N ex ante identical bettors. To stress that our explanation does not rely on heterogeneity 
in prior beliefs, we make the conventional assumption that bettors share a common prior belief, 
q ∈ (0, 1), that the realized outcome will be k = 1.3
1 For surveys of the empirical literature see Richard H. Thaler and William T. Ziemba (1988), Donald B. Hausch and 
Ziemba (1995), and Bruno Jullien and Bernard Salanié (2008).
2 In reality, racetrack bettors are allowed to commit money over time. The tote board displays provisional odds and 
updates them at discrete time intervals. Betting is then closed at post time when the race starts. Given that a substantial 
amount of money is wagered just before post time (National Thoroughbred Racing Association 2004), we focus on the 
last-minute simultaneous game.
3 In a model with heterogeneous beliefs (but without private information), Mukhtar M. Ali (1977) shows that equilib-
rium market probabilities tend to be less extreme than the bettors’ median belief. In a model with heterogeneous prior
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Each bettor i ∈ {1, … , N} privately observes a signal leading to the private belief pi ∈ (0, 1) 
that outcome 1 will be realized. Conditional on k, signals (and therefore private beliefs) are 
independently and identically distributed across bettors. For convenience, we further assume 
that each bettor’s private belief p is distributed according to a strictly increasing and continuous 
cumulative distribution G with full support over (0, 1). By Bayes’s rule, the private belief satisfies
(1)   p _____ 
1 − p  =   
 q
 _____ 
1 − q   
g( p | 1) ______
g( p | 2) .
Given that the densities satisfy the strict monotone likelihood ratio property, the cumulative distribu-
tions are ranked by first-order stochastic dominance: G( p | 1) < G( p | 2) for all p ∈ (0, 1). Intuitively, 
higher Bayesian beliefs about outcome 1 are more likely to occur when 1 is the true outcome.4
On the basis of the private belief, each bettor decides the outcome on which to bet a fixed and 
indivisible amount, normalized to 1.5 After the realization of outcome k, the total amount of 
money in the parimutuel pool is divided equally among those who bet on the winning outcome, 
k. Let bk denote the total amount bet on k. If k is the winning outcome, then every unit bet on k 
receives the monetary payoff (b1 + b2)/bk .
All bettors are risk neutral and maximize individually their expected monetary payoff, condi-
tional on the information available when betting.6 A bettor’s strategy maps every private belief 
into one of the two possible bets. In equilibrium, every bettor correctly conjectures the oppo-
nents’ strategies and plays a best response to this conjecture. Given that by construction the game 
is symmetric with respect to the players, we restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, in which 
all bettors use the same strategy.7
II. Equilibrium
Given the opponents’ identical strategy, each bettor can calculate c(l | k), the conditional chance 
that an opponent bets on outcome l when k is the winning outcome. A bettor’s payoff conditional 
on winning is random, because opponents’ signals and bets are uncertain. We consider the game 
in the limit as the number of players grows, N → ∞, where the law of large numbers guarantees 
that the uncertainty over the aggregate distribution of signals (and therefore of bets) vanishes. In 
beliefs and private information, Ottaviani and Sørensen (2005) formulate a complementary explanation for under-reac-
tion based on the interaction of these two ingredients. That explanation is valid even when traders are allowed to revise 
their positions in response to the private information revealed by the odds, as in a fully revealing rational expectations 
equilibrium. In contrast, the explanation proposed here crucially relies on the fact that bettors do not know the final 
odds in a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. See the discussion in Section IV.
4 Thus, we depart from Ali’s (1977) formulation by making explicit the dependence of the distribution of beliefs on 
the true outcome.
5 Ottaviani and Sørensen (forthcoming) endogenize the participation decision by allowing bettors to derive recre-
ational utility when partaking in the market. Bettors with more extreme posterior beliefs are the last ones to be driven 
out of the market. As the recreational utility is reduced and the no-trade outcome is approached, the main features of 
the outcome achieved are similar to those obtained in the current formulation with forced participation when the num-
ber of bettors becomes arbitrarily large.
6 Our model assumes risk neutrality to avoid confounding our information-based explanation with biases induced 
by risk preferences. The FLB is also consistent with risk-loving preferences (see Martin Weitzman 1965). As we argue 
in Section IV, our theory can rationalize not only the FLB but also the informativeness of the changes in odds close to 
post time.
7 In a setting with binary signals, Frédéric Koessler, Charles Noussair, and Anthony Ziegelmeyer (2008) note that 
asymmetric equilibria may also exist when the number of bettors, N, is small. Here, we instead focus on the limit as 
N → ∞. In addition, equilibrium analysis in our model is simplified by positing continuously distributed signals.
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this limit, a fraction c(k | k) of bets is on the winner when the outcome is k, and thus the expected 
payment to each bet on k is 1/c(k | k).
By risk neutrality, a bettor with private belief p expects to obtain a payoff equal to p/c(1 | 1) − 1 
when betting on outcome 1, and (1 − p)/c(2 | 2) − 1 when betting on outcome 2. Let  __ p ∈ (0, 1) be 
the unique solution to  
__ p /c(1 | 1) = (1 −  __ p )/c(2 | 2). A bettor with threshold belief  __ p is indifferent 
between betting on either of the two outcomes. Symmetric equilibrium requires  
__ p =  ˆ    p, where
 ˆ  
 
 p is the threshold belief conjectured for each opponent. Since c(1 | 1) = 1 − G(  ˆ    p | 1) and c(2 | 2) 
= G( ˆ    p | 2), the equilibrium threshold belief,  ˆ    p, is the unique solution to
(2)   p _____ 
1 − p  =    
c(1 | 1) _____
c(2 | 2)  =   
1 − G( p | 1)  _________
G( p | 2)  .
Uniqueness follows from the fact that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in p, while the right-
hand side is nonincreasing.
III. Surprise
To investigate market efficiency, empiricists typically group observations into classes accord-
ing to their market probabilities, where the market probability of outcome 1 is equal to the 
fraction of money bet on that outcome, π = b1/N. For each observation class, empiricists then 
compute the associated empirical probability as the fraction of races that are won by the horses 
in the class. When comparing market and empirical probabilities, empiricists typically find a 
systematic difference between these probabilities: when the market probability is large, it is still 
smaller than the corresponding empirical probability. That is, a favorite is more likely to win 
than indicated by the market probability. Conversely, market probabilities of longshots overpre-
dict on average their empirical probabilities computed from race outcomes.
Our explanation for the FLB relies on the fact that realized market probabilities contain infor-
mation about the chance of different outcomes. Applying Bayes’s rule, for any realized market 
probability we can compute the corresponding posterior probability belief, β, that outcome 1 
will be realized, incorporating the information contained by the realization of this market prob-
ability in equilibrium. The law of large numbers guarantees that the empirical frequency of out-
come 1 across a large sample of outcomes is approximately equal to this posterior probability, β. 
This posterior probability incorporates the information revealed in the betting distribution, and 
thus correctly estimates the outcome’s empirical probability.
When exactly b1 out of N bets are placed on 1, Bayes’s rule yields the posterior probability
(3) β =   q Pr (bets | 1 true)  ____________ 
Pr(bets)  =    
qc(1 | 1 ) b1 [1 − c(1 | 1) ] N−b1 
    ___________________________________________  
qc(1 | 1 ) b1 [1 − c(1 | 1) ] N−b1 + (1 − q)[1 − c(2 | 2) ] b1 c(2 | 2 ) N−b1      ,
using the binomial distribution of bets. We are now ready to compare any given market prob-
ability π = b1/N with the associated posterior probability β:
PROPOSITION 1: In the limit, as the number of bettors becomes arbitrarily large, N → ∞, for 
market probabilities
(4)  π > π* =    log A(1 − c(1 | 1))/c(2 | 2)B    _____________________________________    
log A(1 − c(1 | 1))/c(2 | 2)B + log A(1 − c(2 | 2))/c(1 | 1)B 
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(respectively, π < π* ), the posterior probability β revealed by the bets is 1 (respectively, 0).
PROOF.
Using π = b1/N, rewrite (3) as
(5)   β _____ 
1 − β  =   
q
 _____ 
1 − q a  c(1 | 1 ) π [1 − c(1 | 1) ] (1−π)   __________________  [1 − c(2 | 2) ] π c(2 | 2 ) (1−π)    b N .
Consider the limit as N goes to infinity, when the realized bets contain full information about the 
outcome, as they are based on an increasing number of i.i.d. signals. Thus, the right-hand side of 
(5) tends to zero or infinity, depending on whether the realized π is below or above the switch-
ing market probability π*, as defined in (4). Because market bets perfectly reveal the outcome, 
the posterior probability β converges to either zero or one. The result then follows immediately 
from (5).
According to this result, the FLB results from the surprise generated by the realization of 
the market probability. For high (or low) market probabilities, the posterior, and thus empirical, 
probability is higher (or lower) than the market probability. More precisely, whether an outcome 
is the ex ante favorite or longshot, when sufficiently many (or few) bettors choose it, the outcome 
is revealed to be even more (less) likely than indicated by the market probability.
Intuitively, the observation of one more bet on outcome 1 is good news for outcome 1 because 
c(1 | 1) = 1 − G( p | 1) > 1 − G( p | 2) = 1 − c(2 | 2). When the fraction of bets placed on outcome 
1 is exactly equal to π*, this piece of news is exactly neutralized by the fact that fraction 1 − π* 
bet on outcome 2, and the posterior probability is equal to the prior, β = q. When the realized 
market probability π is above the switching level π*, favorable news outweighs unfavorable news 
for outcome 1—and with a population of infinite size, this realization reveals that outcome 1 is 
true with probability 1.
The FLB predicted in this simple setting is clearly extreme. With an infinite number of bettors 
with i.i.d. signals, the information contained in the market probability fully reveals outcome k. 
Thus, the posterior β formed after aggregating the information of all the individual bets is equal 
to either 0 or 1. Posterior probabilities would be bounded (and the FLB less extreme than here) 
in more realistic specifications of the model that allow for conditionally dependent signals across 
bettors or, equivalently, an unpredictable component in the outcome realization.
IV. Discussion
This paper contributes to the literature by linking the FLB in parimutuel markets to the surprise 
generated by the information contained in last-minute movements of market odds. In contrast, 
informed bettors share the same information in William Hurley and Lawrence McDonough’s 
(1995) limited arbitrage model, and therefore are not surprised. For odds set by bookmakers 
dealing with privately informed bettors, Hyun Song Shin (1991) derives the FLB as an ex ante 
phenomenon across outcomes with asymmetric prior probabilities. Despite a commonality of 
assumptions, Shin’s explanation for fixed odds markets is fundamentally different from our ex 
post explanation for parimutuel markets.8 Overall, the FLB can be compatible with a weak form 
of the efficient market hypothesis, whether odds are set by bookmakers or the parimutuel system.
8 In ongoing research, we are developing a methodology for comparing the effect of information on the FLB across 
parimutuel and fixed-odds betting markets.
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We conclude by elaborating on the role of three key features of our model. First, we focus on 
analyzing a simultaneous move game. Indeed, waiting until the last minute to bet may allow 
bettors to conceal their private information and use movements in the provisional odds to infer 
the information of others—this incentive rationalizes the observed rush of activity at post time. 
Given that late bets are likely to be made by informed bettors, changes in odds close to post time 
should be informative about race outcomes, as verified empirically by Peter Asch, Burton G. 
Malkiel, and Richard E. Quandt (1982).9 Thus, our theory based on private information is com-
patible with evidence on both the timing of bets and the information content of changes in odds 
near post time. We see this as an important advantage over alternative theories, such as those 
based on risk preferences.10
Second, the FLB arises in our game-theoretic model (as well as at the real-world racetrack) 
because bettors are not allowed to condition their behavior on the final odds. Indeed, bettors in 
parimutuel markets take positions before observing the final realization of the market odds. As 
shown above, our Bayes-Nash equilibrium does not converge to a rational expectations equi-
librium as the number of players increase.11 The FLB would instead be eliminated if rational 
bettors were allowed to revise their positions after the market is closed, as in a rational expecta-
tions equilibrium. Note that in our Bayes-Nash equilibrium the FLB arises even though bettors 
anticipate that the realized bets will be correlated with the likelihood of the outcomes and adjust 
their behavior in anticipation of this correlation.12
Third, we focus here on the limit with an infinite number of bettors who are forced to partici-
pate—for the FLB to result, the number of bettors must be sufficiently large. In a more general 
version of this model, Ottaviani and Sørensen (forthcoming) analyze how the sign and extent of 
the FLB depend on the number of competing bettors, their willingness to participate, the quality 
of their private information, the number of outcomes, the divisibility of bets, and asymmetries 
in prior probabilities. Analyzing the impact of these variables on the signal to noise ratio present 
in equilibrium delivers a number of testable comparative statics predictions broadly in line with 
evidence from parimutuel markets (from horse racing to Lotto).
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